The HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Instituted April 2003) Security Standards mandate health institutions to protect health information against unauthorized use or disclosure. One approach to addressing this mandate is by utilizing user access control and generating audit trails of the various authorized as well as unauthorized user access of health data. Although most current clinical image systems (eg, PACS) have components that generate log files as a solution to address the HIPAA mandate, there is a lack of methodology to obtain and synthesize the pertinent data from the large volumes of log file data generated by these multiple components within a PACS. We have designed and developed a HIPAA Compliant Architecture specifically for tracking and auditing the image workflow of clinical imaging systems such as PACS. As an initial first step, a software toolkit was implemented based on the HIPAA Compliant architecture. The toolkit was implemented within a testbed PACS Simulator located in the Image Processing and Informatics (IPI) lab at the University of Southern California. Evaluation scenarios were developed where different user types performed legal and illegal access of PACS image data within each of the different components in the PACS Simulator. Results were based on whether the scenarios of unauthorized access were correctly identified and documented as well as normal operational activity.
INTRODUCTION
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [1, 2] of 1996, Public Law 104-191, was officially instituted on April 14, 2003 to enforce healthcare providers to be compliant by April, 2005 deadline. The major goal and focus of HIPAA is to set and enforce broad standards in the attempt to protect the privacy and security of health data throughout the patient care environment. To date, there are four types of standards in HIPAA:
1) Transaction and Code Set Standards 2) Identifier Standards 3) Privacy Standards 4) Security Standards In this paper, we focus on the fourth standard type -security. HIPAA Security Standards [3] are aimed at the protection of confidentiality, integrity, and public availability of electronic health information against unauthorized use or disclosure. This is accomplished by utilizing administrative, physical, and technical safeguards. In particular, the technical safeguards consist of technical methods to assure security of the health data. One such technical method proposed by HIPAA is the on-demand generation of an audit trail that can record and examine information system activities such as data access of a specific patient. Specifically, HIPAA compliant audit trails require following information for the health data access [4] :
Identification of the person who accessed the data Identification of the accessed data Where the data was accessed Timestamp of when the data was accessed Types of access (eg, create, read, write, modify, delete) Status of access (eg, success or failure) Because health data and information is such a broad area containing vast amounts of data types, the major focus of this research is on clinical imaging data that is generated and distributed through PACS.
Some efforts have been achieved by developing HIPAA compliant auditing tools for general health information systems [5] [6] [7] . These auditing tools generate audit trails by recording the health data transactions or changes in logs and extracting the pertinent auditing information from these logs on demand. This method is applicable for health information systems that have all the data transactions or data flow controlled by a centralized server, such as Radiology information system (RIS) [8] . However, the data flow is much different in integrated medical imaging systems, such as Picture Archiving and Communication System (PACS). There is no single component that controls and records the data flow of all the multiple components within PACS. This makes it very difficult for these auditing tools to record all the data transactions and changes in PACS. For example, the PACS archive server, even within client-server architecture, has no control of the workflow of the CT modality, and vice versa. Additionally, there are various other components within a PACS that require a system-wide architecture instead of a single componentbased approach. Most current clinical imaging systems have no such ability to generate HIPAA compliant audit trails even though they generate activity logs. Furthermore, even though pertinent auditing information can be extracted from these logs to create audit trails, it requires tedious if not manual methods to produce the requested audit information and analysis. There is a lack of a formal methodology to interpret the potential large volumes of these log data and generate these HIPAA compliant audit trails. Therefore, a HIPAA compliant auditing architecture for integrated medical imaging systems needs to be tailored to the complex workflow.
In this research we present the design and development of a HIPAA Compliant Architecture specifically for tracking and auditing the image workflow of clinical imaging systems such as PACS. The architecture is designed to facilitate the generation of HIPAA compliant audit trails of image data access for a specific patient so that various types of queries can be performed on demand. It also provides the mechanisms to automatically monitor the data flow of PACS and facilitating the detection of unauthorized image access and other abnormal activities. As an initial first step, a software toolkit, called HIPAA Compliant Auditing System (HCAS), was implemented based on partial components from the HIPAA Compliant architecture. This initial HCAS toolkit was implemented and evaluated within a testbed PACS Simulator located in the Image Processing and Informatics (IPI) lab at the University of Southern California. Evaluation scenarios were developed and results were based on whether the scenarios of unauthorized access were correctly identified and documented as well as normal operational activity.
METHODS AND MATERIALS

Design Criteria
In order to apply the HIPAA Compliant Architecture for auditing and tracking clinical images to various PACS generating different format log files, it must be independent from any individual PACS architecture or manufacturer. For this reason, we define the necessary architecture criteria as follows:
1) HIPAA Compliant
The ability to facilitate generation of the HIPAA compliant auditing trail report in terms of who access it, when, where, what are accessed, access status, and access types.
2) Open and Extensible
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Provide interfaces for integration of new auditing or monitoring techniques and the ability to support current HIPAA auditing requirements and accommodate new HIPAA additions in the future without affecting already existed components.
3) Portable
Not tied-down to any individual PACS or PACS architecture.
4) No interruption of clinical PACS workflow
Any interruption on the workflow of PACS is avoided.
HIPAA Compliant Architecture Development
Based on the criteria described above, the HIPAA Compliant Architecture was designed as a four-layer system shown in Fig. 1 . The first layer (the lowest layer) is the Record layer, consisting of various logs within PACS components. By logically separating PACS logs from other components in HCAS, independence from PACS and portability can be achieved. The second layer is the Audit layer, which includes a centralized auditing database and other audit data analysis and interpretation tools. HIPAA compliant audit trails can be generated based on the auditing database. This layer also enables us to automatically monitor the data flow of PACS, which greatly assists PACS management. The third layer is Notification layer, which has a Notification component sending warning or alert messages of abnormal events to end users, such as PACS administrators. Finally, in the fourth layer, end users can decide to take certain actions against these abnormal events. These layers will be described in more detail in the following paragraphs.
Record Layer
This first layer is the data resource layer, including but not limited to the various types of log data shown in Figure  1 . PACS application logs are event logs generated by the individual PACS applications. For example, an image query/retrieve event in PACS archive server may include such information as time, local host name, DICOM Application Entity Title (AET), patient information and query/retrieve status. PACS user login logs record user login events in each individual PACS component. Other computer system logs generated in PACS components, such as application access logs, can also provide supplement information.
Due to the flexibility of this architecture, new logs can also be added to this layer. For example, an image integrity log can be added to record image data integrity verification events. Data integrity, as one requirement of HIPAA Security Standards, refers to protecting image data from being altered or destroyed by unauthorized users. A Lossless digital signature embedding (LDSE) method has been developed to ensure the data integrity of medical images at IPI laboratory [9] . By recording signature verification time, local machine, and signature verification status in the integrity log, the LDSE method can provide logs to generate HIPAA compliant audit trails on the data integrity of image. To extract and interpret the pertinent information from thousands of log events requires proper methodology, which will be addressed in the second layer, the Audit layer.
Audit Layer
As shown in Fig. 1 , the Audit Layer is the heart of the architecture. It collects the audit data from distributed PACS components and stores the data in a centralized auditing database. The database is then used for audit analysis and automatic monitoring. Currently, there are seven components in this layer: Audit Log Collector, Syslog Server, Log Data Normalizer, Auditing Database, Audit Analysis Tool, Role-based Policy and Monitor Tool.
a. Audit Log Collector
Because the audit data is scattered within large volume of logs, a collector was designed to extract the pertinent data from logs and send the data to the centralized Auditing Database. PACS logs may be stored with different formats, such as database tables or textual files. The collector must support all these types of logs.
b. Syslog (System log) server
The pertinent data extracted from PACS logs are distributed in different PACS components connected by digital networks. In order to store them in the centralized Auditing database, a transmission mechanism is needed. Currently, syslog [10] is a de-facto standard for transport and storage of event notification messages in UNIX systems, network devices and network applications. Syslog is a client-server mechanism. The clients can be configured to locally store event messages or directly send event messages to the server without local storage. Syslog uses User Datagram Protocol (UDP) to transfer event messages. This feature can be utilized to reduce the overhead added to the image transmission in PACS caused by event message communication, since PACS uses DICOM (Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine) Protocol and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). For this advantage, syslog technology was adopted as the architecture standard to transfer pertinent log data. The data is converted to syslog format by the syslog client in each PACS component. The client then sends the data to Syslog server, which will forward the data to the Log Data Normalizer.
Notification
c. Log Data Normalizer
The pertinent data extracted from PACS components might have different terminologies for the same object. For example, the name "film librarian" in the CT modality might be named as "clerk" in an MR modality. For this reason, a Log Data Normalizer was designed to normalize the data into common terms and then add them to the Auditing Database.
d. Auditing Database
In order to generate HIPAA compliant audit trails in a short time, a centralized database was designed to preserve all the obtained auditing data. The structure of database was designed based on the requirement of HIPAA compliant audit trails, including: who, when, where, what, how, and status. Patient information, such as name and id, and other relevant information are also included in the database. The advantages to use database technology to preserve the log data are:
• No loss of historical logs: since all the logs generated in PACS components are obtained and stored in the database everyday, there is no loss of log data when these logs are overwritten and updated by PACS components.
• Centralized management of data access information: The image data access events for an individual patient usually happen in multiple PACS components. For example, an event that a CT image is generated in a CT modality and another event that the same CT image is retrieved to viewing workstation for clinical review are related to the same patient. But these two events were recorded in two different logs at two separate PACS components. Without centralized database, the pertinent information needs to be extracted from these two components every time HIPAA compliant audit trails of image access for this patient is desired. Therefore, a centralized database enables us to quickly generate audit trails.
e. Audit Analysis Tool
Most current PACS lack a mechanism to dynamically monitor the data flow, which results in PACS management mostly relying on the experience of PACS administrators. A monitoring tool that can automatically analyze the data to find abnormal patterns and make decisions on the patterns would make PACS management much easier. To develop such a tool, the information of data flow of PACS needs to be collected and analyzed in real time. With audit data collected in the auditing database, the HIPAA Compliant architecture can provide this ability using some data analysis techniques, such as Intrusion detection technology [12] . Audit Analysis Tool is the component to perform such data analysis functions.
f. Monitor Tool
After the Audit Analysis Tool finds abnormal patterns in the data flow of PACS, a Monitor Tool was designed to monitor the pattern, and make decisions whether it is an unauthorized data access for the abnormal pattern based on the Role-based Policy. Any pattern that violates the Policy would automatically cause a warning or alert result. For example, Audit analysis tool discovers an abnormal pattern of image query/retrieve by a PACS user "A", belonging to the role of "Clerk", which was defined to have no image query/retrieve right in the Policy. The Monitor tool automatically makes a decision that this is an unauthorized image query/retrieve and gives a warning message.
g. Role-based Policy
The Role-based Policy defines the roles for PACS users based on the roles they performed in the clinical environment, such as clerk, PACS manager, and Radiologists, and the image access rights for each role. Two types of policies, Normal policy and Disaster policy, are defined for two different conditions. Normal policy is for daily operation, whereas Disaster policy is defined for the emergency situations, such as earthquake, when normal policy can be bypassed.
Notification Layer
Notification layer consists of a notification component, which receives the warning or alert messages from the Audit layer and notifies PACS end users of the unauthorized image data access and other abnormal activities.
Action Layer
Action Layer is designed for PACS end users to take actions, such as access control, against the unauthorized image access and other abnormal activities. This four-layer architecture enables PACS to generate HIPAA compliant audit trails of image data access for a specific patient on demand. Meanwhile, it can automatically monitor the data flow of PACS facilitating PACS management. With an open and extensible design, the architecture can also easily incorporate new data analysis and monitoring techniques, and be extended to support future HIPAA requirements.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A HIPAA Compliant Auditing System (HCAS) toolkit has been developed for automatic monitoring the data flow of PACS based on partial components of the Audit Layer in the architecture [12] . The HCAS toolkit and its GUI were installed in a UNIX machine. The toolkit can monitor the dynamic data flow of PACS. First, it collects pertinent auditing data from PACS application logs, PACS user login logs and other computer system logs. It then stores the log data in the Auditing Database. Next, the toolkit compares the user name in every record in the Auditing Database and the user name in the policy table. If a match occurs, the toolkit further compares the application name in the database record and the application name in the policy table. If any comparison failed, the HCAS toolkit gives out a warning message of unauthorized image data access in its graphic user interface (GUI). Otherwise, a normal message is given out. Currently, the toolkit lacks the ability to generate HIPAA compliant audit trails of image data access for a specific patient. This function is currently in development.
In order to evaluate the impact of this HCAS toolkit in PACS, a laboratory-based PACS Simulator [13, 14] was implemented with the toolkit to simulate the data flow of clinical PACS. The Simulator can simulate the complete data workflow of clinical PACS from patient registration to exam ordering, and to image generation, image archive and display. The clinical images used for simulation are replenished continuously through a clinical PACS connection but with the patient information in the DICOM header of the image removed. Figure 2 shows the implementation of the HCAS with the PACS Simulator for evaluation.
The log collector clients are installed in every component except the RIS Simulator to receive event messages of each image data access activity generated by these components. Log messages generated are automatically collected and inputted into the HCAS toolkist via the Syslog Server. The log data includes what, when and where images are accessed. In addition, user login logs and computer system logs are collected. These data, along with log
